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Abstract 
Companies have for years tried to figure out how to consistently organize their business units for improving quality and 
efficiency and at the same time reduce costs and lead times. Toyota's production system (TPS) and its core principles 
have become the global benchmark. This system was developed throughout the 1950's and refined and improved to 
present. One of the main pillars is batch reduction – ultimately down to one-piece flow – which in turn leads to 
improved quality and flexibility. Quality at the source (QatS) was and still is a mantra at Toyota. However, we observe 
that in many firms lean and quality are frequently organized as separate and disintegrated departments and systems – 
often with overlapping goals. This paper reports on case studies done in three Norwegian manufacturing firms. The case 
studies aim to explore the relationship - or the lack thereof - between quality and lean as integrated parts of a holistic 
production system. Our three cases demonstrate that QatS may have something to do with maturity level of product and 
manufacturing technology, degree of standardization and stabilization, and the combination of explicit and tacit 
knowledge.  
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1. Introduction 
Increased globalization and competition greatly influence 
the way manufacturing companies in different parts of the 
world respond to pressures for improved quality and 
efficiency and reduced costs and lead times. The Toyota 
production system (TPS) is for many companies worldwide 
the benchmark. At the same time, quality systems from the 
ISO organization (i.e. ISO 9001, ISO TS 16949, 14001) have 
in many companies led to the emergence of separate business 
units and systems for tackling quality the "ISO-way". This 
"ISO-way" has not been fully integrated with the 
organizations' production systems, thus resulting in two 
separate systems for dealing with quality, efficiency, costs 
and lead times. Since the overall goals of the "Toyota-way" 
and "ISO-way" are overlapping, their integration into a 
holistic production system should in principle be 
straightforward. However, there may be practical challenges, 
although the expected benefits from merging the systems 
together may be many: reduced bureaucracy, increased 
efficiency, improved quality, and hence increased 
profitability.   
This article explores this issue in the context of three 
Norwegian manufacturing companies, all global marked 
players, with extensive pressures to reduce costs in order to 
stay competitive in a high cost country. First, the article 
outlines the theoretical background of production systems. 
Second, the methodology is briefly explained. Thirdly, three 
industrial case studies illustrate how differences in maturity 
level influence the integration of quality and lean in 
production systems. Finally, conclusions and implications for 
practitioners and further research are presented.  
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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1.1. Literature 
Few researchers have tried to define production systems in 
general terms. Hubka and Eder [1] attempted to do so by 
presenting four subsystems; 1) the human system, 2) the 
technical system, 3) the information system, and 4) the 
management system, which all affect the transformation 
process from raw materials to products. A more recent 
description is provided by Clarke who claims that production 
systems represent the changing nature of the form and 
function of standardization [2]. By standardization he does not 
exclusively mean product standardization but also 
standardization of processes and work. Nevertheless, the 
history of production systems goes far back in time, and the 
military is often said to be a forerunner [3].  
During the 18th century machines, jigs, fixtures and 
gauging systems developed towards part conformation and 
standardized interchangeable parts. Application of 
standardization and production systems went from military 
arms production to sewing, meat packing and to the early 
automotive industry [4]. Instead of individual freedom of the 
craftsman to design and produce, production engineers now 
made detailed drawings and guidelines, hence eroding the 
need for operators to think about work processes.  
The next step was to fragment and standardize work tasks 
according to time and motion studies [5], leading to increased 
efficiency alongside improved product quality. Complexity 
was handled by subdividing the problem into minor tasks, 
easy to perform, which require a minimum of training and 
learning at the shop floor level. This approach separated 
thinking, doing, improving and performing, and assumed that 
workers were primarily driven by monetary incentives [6]. 
Mass production represented the first holistic production 
system, taking into account technology, processes, work 
standards as well as social standards regulating payment and 
working conditions. 
The next major step in the evolution of production systems 
is the Toyota Production System (TPS). Toyota Motor 
Company was established in 1930, and this new company 
struggled through the 1930s by making poor quality vehicles 
based on primitive technology [7]. They decided to 
benchmark their processes against Ford and GM, but the 
implementation effort was put on hold because of World War 
II. The work continued in the 1950s [8], where Toyota found 
that the mass production system was a wasteful batch-
production building up huge work-in-process inventory 
throughout the value chain - pushing products to the next 
process step [9]. This rigid and capital intensive system was 
seen as inappropriate for serving the dispersed, low volume 
market in Japan. In addition, the use of highly specialized 
workers at the American auto-companies, which were easy to 
replace, was an approach irreconcilable with Japanese work 
culture. This view emphasizes the human beings as the 
bedrock of all organizations in which solutions to problems 
are highly situation dependent. An example by Peter Drucker, 
referred to by Kamata [10], shows that it was a long way to go 
for the theory of collaboration; in the late 1940s General 
Motors introduced what was later called “quality circles” as a 
partnership between managers and workers to improve 
products and processes, but the “United Auto Workers” 
(UAW) resisted and argued that even asking workers about 
their jobs was an unfair labor practice.  
The TPS therefore proposes a different system of standards 
to achieve manufacturing efficiency with a minimum of 
resources through continuous improvement. The latter is 
regarded as  major responsibility of the shopfloor worker. In 
the beginning of the 1950s American management practises, 
such as quality control, pioneered by Deming [11], were 
introduced and implemented. During the early 1960s Toyota 
introduced the first company wide total quality system, based 
on QatS and learning by doing principles [2]. QatS is today 
one of the main principles of the TPS, focusing on in-process 
quality and stabilization of processes [12].  
The success of Toyota was soon recognized by other 
Japanese companies, and the spread of TPS to suppliers 
pushed towards formalization of the system [13] – resulting in 
the first publication by Ohno in 1978. This development- and 
formalization process continued throughout the 1980s and 
1990s as Toyota expanded its operations globally. Finally, the 
MIT study concluded that the performance of TPS was 
unimpacted by culture, history, and social background, stating 
the new universal lean paradigm [14]. From a learning 
perspective TPS can be viewed as routinized learning 
capabilities applied at real life  problem solving [15]. 
Another production system, known as the Volvo Uddevalla 
experiment, is based on principles of industrial democracy 
and teamwork. This system encourages workers to help each 
other to solve complex problems and smoothing out the work 
flow in parallel lines [2]. Placing human considerations in 
center, Volvo was aiming at increased flexibility, worker 
motivation and of course sustained efficiency and quality. The 
system demonstrated some promising features, but the factory 
closed down in a few years due to large variations in work 
methods and product quality [2].   
Today most manufacturing companies build and develop 
their production system on the TPS. It is claimed that lean is 
not an option, it is mandatory for manufacturing firms 
operating in global markets [7]. Hence, a competitive factor is 
how companies manage to evolve from a company specific 
production system to a company-wide production system 
[16]. The latter raises many questions about degrees of 
freedom, and involvement in implementing such systems at 
different locations.  
A core principle in TPS is QatS, achieved through the 
design of production systems that immediately uncover poor 
quality [17]. Combined with the emergent trends of company-
wide production systems and compliance to ISO-standards, 
we propose the following research question: 
In which ways are quality (systems) integrated into 
holistic production systems in manufacturing 
companies? 
2. Method 
This study has been part of a national research project 
concerned with work organization and operations 
management in Norwegian industry. Three case companies 
were investigated through assessments, observations, semi-
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structured interviews, and reading of company 
documentation. The research design combines the benefits of 
an in-depth single case study with increased external validity 
achieved through the comparison of multiple cases [18].  
The research team has worked closely with the case 
companies for two years, gaining thorough understanding of 
their operational challenges and opportunities. The company 
documentation describes the companies’ production systems, 
including the official organization structure and operational 
principles. 10–20 employees were interviewed in each case 
company. Company documentation and transcribed 
interviews were coded for recurring themes [19] Findings 
were later on discussed with central management, adding 
respondent validation. 
The case companies were chosen based on similar global 
market pressures for lean and quality, for having 
manufacturing plants in Norway, and for having different 
expected maturity level in terms of integrating lean and 
quality in their production systems.  
2.1. Framework 
A framework for analyzing the relationship between 
quality, lean and profitability is based on the socio-technical 
lean model presented by Morgan and Liker [20]. This model 
highlights the dependability between skilled people, 
technology and processes, which are represented on the left 
hand side in Figure 1, with a set of factors describing each of 
them. The model is differentiated when it comes to the 
definition of moderators. 
First, we emphasize that technology are inherent both in 
products and manufacturing equipment, claiming that a firm 
can face different maturity levels and stages depending on the 
pathway from enabling technologies [21]. From the point of 
maturity level, which is regarded as a model moderator, there 
can be outlined different scenarios. For instance a company 
that has a first mover strategy may benefit from successfully 
developing a new product that hits the market – despite initial 
quality errors or delivery problems. This can be resolved by 
time, adding to the level of maturity and sustaining 
profitability by reduced costs of poor quality. 
Second, process enablers are subdivided into 
standardization and stabilization which are core elements in 
optimizing a firms value stream [15]. Standardized work, 
which is described, followed-up, and improved by those who 
are supposed to perform the task, is a prerequisite for 
improved stabilization and quality. Degree of stabilization 
also tells when a process is ready to be improved [12], 
whether the step is incremental or radical. But, here as well, 
huge deviations can be observed in parallel with reasonably 
profits due to operations in high margin markets.  
Third, people play an essential role in mastering 
technology and processes [7]. A simplified path from people 
to a learning organization can be modeled through culture and 
structure and the transferability of knowledge [22]. Structure 
can be viewed as the context of explicit knowledge which is 
regarded as relatively easy to codify and transfer. The culture 
dimension, tacit knowledge, is more personal and difficult to 
articulate and codify, described as know-how embedded in 
daily task performance [23]. Knowledge as a moderator says 
something about the depth and breadth of organizational 
competence. Organizations can on the one hand have experts 
occasionally lifting the company towards excellence and on 
the other hand build a more robust quality system involving 
shop floor workers and managers. 
 
esults 
3. Results 
3.1. Case A 
Case A is a family owned company developing and 
producing thruster systems for the global ship building 
industry. It employees about 300 employees, and has for years 
earned decent profits. By taking systems responsibility for 
critical safety and navigation equipment the company has 
found a market niche for ships demanding frequent quay visits 
and high precision level, such as supply boats, ferries and 
cruise ships. The key to sustaining this market position is 
reliability and relatively low lifetime product costs.  
The export ratio is increasing due to the fact that ship 
building has become a global industry where over 90 % of the 
tonnage is built in Japan, South Korea, and China. New and 
demanding customers put pressure on the case company to 
become certified in accordance to ISO 9001, ISO 14001, and 
OSHAS 18001 – statuses the company does not have today.  
Historically, the company has managed to be ahead of their 
competitors with regard to product functionality and 
reliability, meaning that they score relatively high on 
introducing new product technology. This technological 
position is, however, gained by quite conventional 
manufacturing equipment and systems, meaning that the 
competitive advantage is their ability to develop state-of-the-
art product technology, giving a steady stream of profit 
despite in-house quality challenges. The latter is described as 
a considerably amount of rework, which is detected internally 
before products are released to the customer. A high degree of 
one-of-kind production, in addition to costly materials and 
value added processes, means that the scrap rate is as low as 
zero, since the cost of scrapping normally exceeds the cost of 
rework.  
Figure 1. Research Framework 
Technology  
Product 
Stabilize 
Standardize 
People 
Process 
Structure 
Manufacturing 
Profit 
Quality  
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Improv e 
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These findings point to improvement potential when it 
comes to processes, specifically for standardization and 
stabilization. Since the company grows, it ultimately needs 
more space for operations, and new investments are compared 
against capacity potentials in existing locations. Here, the 
amount of rework and other wastes are detected and 
measured, and become objects to improve by increased focus 
on work processes. Blue collar workers at the case company 
are used to take responsibility. For instance they do not 
hesitate to call upon attention if there are mismatches between 
technical drawings and what is possible to realize in practice. 
This is an asset, but depends heavily on individual judgment, 
competence, and experience – or in other words tacit 
knowledge. Expanding capacity by adding working shifts and 
foreign workers will further challenge this marginal and 
individually dependent practice – increasing the demand for 
translating the tacit to knowledge into explicit knowledge.  
Summing up the results, by the moderators, the company 
earns their profit by high level product technology developed 
and manufactured by local experts, giving room for 
improvements in work processes and reliable quality. 
However, they are at the moment introducing a holistic 
production system that includes QatS, which is seen as 
prerequisite for expanding business.  
3.2. Case B                        
Case B produces primary aluminum in a magnitude of 2.4 
million tons per year – from plants around the world. Pure 
aluminum is extracted from alumina during an electrolysis 
process. The material yield, product quality and energy 
consumption are highly dependent on three critical processes; 
anode operations, alumina control, and heat balance. These 
key processes are interlinked, and together they define 
production stability which is essential for improving 
competitiveness in the industry. Therefore, standardization of 
work processes, and how to organize for following-up and 
improving these standards, has been a focus area for years.  
Aggregated numbers from 2009 to 2013 show 14 % 
improvement in terms of tonnage per employee and 30 % 
decline in customer complaints. Improvements are derived 
primarily from increased stabilization of conventional and 
existing production technology. Thereby, the moderator 
maturity ranks high both when it comes to product and 
manufacturing technology, with a few exceptions for special 
alloys delivered from next door cast houses. Not being a niche 
producer, the flip side of a high maturity score is that the 
company is solely dependent upon commodity prices set at 
the London Metal Exchange. The same high score can be 
associated to the moderator improvement as well. This is 
based on achieved cost and quality results, but foremost the 
underlying work of standardization of key enabling processes.  
The case company's production system emphasizes 
standardization as one of five core principles, and the basis for 
improvement, in both production and quality system, are 
Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs). These procedures are 
derived from praxis, meaning that the initial set-up of a SOP 
is created by those who are most familiar with the real 
processes. Improvement proposals serve as input to a cross 
functional group responsible for refining the standard. 
Involvement and employee driven improvements are 
manifested through that all employees are member of at least 
one improvement team - responsible for either critical 
processes or TPM (Total Productive Maintenance) activities.  
The mandate of a critical process group is to standardize 
and improve key processes – based on input from several 
channels. Examples of channels are recorded KPIs from each 
shift, observations made through SOP-WOC (Standard 
Operation Procedure - Walk, Observe, Communicate), which 
are planned points in time where management, technical staff 
and operators in commonality check to what extent work is 
performed according to the standard, and general input from 
shift representatives, deviation database, technical 
supervisors, and TPM groups.  
These reflections demonstrate the closely linked process 
and people view, where the formal competence system goes 
in parallel with work procedures. The continuous process of 
aluminum production requires presence of operators 24/7/365, 
so explicating knowledge through standards, routines and 
check lists are defined as a means to stabilize production and 
improve quality.  
This case company has a long history of improvement 
programs, starting in the early 1980s with TQM initiatives 
with successive programs during the 1990s and 2000s. Long 
term history of improving operations explains some of the 
relatively high scores on maturity, improvement and 
knowledge.    
3.3. Case C 
Case C develops, produces and delivers different structural 
extrusion based products to the automotive industry. The main 
products are crash management systems for cars, both front 
and rear, which consist of a bumper beams and crash-boxes in 
a multitude of configurations aiming to reduce damage to 
exterior components in low-speed impacts and keep the front 
structure together in high-speed impacts. 
Beyond the safety requirements, one of the main 
advantages is the use of light weight solutions, contributing to 
reduced fuel consumption and emissions during the use phase 
of the product. Hence, the product technology is regarded 
advanced in terms of functionality and weight reduction, but 
mostly to be found in the premium car segment due to high 
unit price.  
The company was sold in 2009 from a partly owned 
Norwegian governmental firm to a multinational automotive 
company employing more than 20.000 employees. Today, the 
Norwegian plant employs about 500 people. Operations 
include an integrated value chain with cast-house, aluminum 
extrusion and forming technology. The equipment is rather 
conventional and well-proven manufacturing technology. 
Their competitive advantage is related to tooling technology. 
Stability, reliability and efficiency are keys to remain a mass 
producer in Norway. These keys are also reflected in their 
continuous improvement work, which has a relatively long 
history in the company.  
Back in 1980s, customer impulses and contracts in the 
automotive industry stated an expected yearly price reduction 
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due to anticipated internal learning curves. Successively, these 
expectations were expressed as focal areas in terms of quality 
and zero-defect strategies. During the early 2000s a 
comprehensive improvement program, based on lean 
principles, was initiated. This program included typical 
elements such as TPM, just-in-time, reduced change over 
times, housekeeping, but also focused on team work and 
giving responsibility to those who were close to value creating 
activities. Another feature was that this lean-program was 
anchored, and integrated, in the existing quality and HES 
system. Putting quality in center and aligning it to the 
continuous work of reducing variation and improving tooling 
technology, lead to a doubling of factory up-time, tripling the 
number of good parts pr time unit and reducing change over 
time by 60 %.  The scale and scope of quality improvement 
made the company win Toyota's quality price twice.  
After the acquisition in 2009, continuous improvement is 
still the way of working – aiming for 5-7 % efficiency 
improvement annually. Quality is one of four corner stones in 
the new regime of the multinational owner. The main 
difference compared to earlier practices is that quality and 
lean are separated by organizational boundaries, but by 
overlapping goals in terms of improvement requirements. 
From the perspective of the research model, quality is still 
highlighted and improved, but with possibilities for increased 
cost of administration and communication. In sum, the case 
company has mature manufacturing technology producing 
high-end niche products. Despite this position, the industry 
gives relatively low profit margins, leaving continuous 
improvement mandatory. However, being part of a 
multinational production system may place quality in a more 
distant position compared to some years ago. 
3.4. Summary of results 
With the initial research framework as a basis, Table 1 
describes some essential properties of the case companies.  
Our results show that only one of the investigated 
companies (Case B) had managed to integrate quality and lean 
in their production systems. This company is characterized by 
high maturity with respect to manufacturing technology and 
processes. The superior integration is also due to the fact that 
Company B had reached a high level of maturity with respect 
to their production system, which also systematically 
incorporates QatS. In comparison, Company A had focused 
less on developing a holistic production system and the 
production system of Company C had been subject to recent 
revisions because of changes in ownership. Simply put, 
Company B has over time put in a more systematic effort to 
refine and sustain their production system. Company A and C 
have different maturity level when it comes to technology and 
process. However, both have developed separate 
organizational systems for handling quality and lean. A 
drawback with establishing parallel systems is increased 
bureaucracy and potentially poor coordination. This may lead 
to increased indirect costs. 
Concerning the people dimension, Company A shows the 
most interesting pattern. Although they have a mature culture 
for employee involvement and problem solving, they seem to 
lack a coherent structure for channeling this involvement into 
making the processes more mature. The other companies have 
less cultural maturity, but compensate by having 
institutionalized more mature structures for continuous 
improvement. These findings support the structural focus of 
both lean and ISO blueprints for improvement.  
Table 1. Summary of Results 
 Company 
A 
 
Company 
B 
 
Company 
C 
 
Technology – 
Product:  
Maturity Level 
High Low Medium 
Technology – 
Manufacturing: 
Maturity Level 
Medium High High 
Process – 
Standardization: 
Maturity Level 
Low High High 
Process – 
Stabilization: 
Maturity Level 
Low High High 
People – Structure: 
Maturity Level 
Low Medium Medium 
People – Culture: 
Maturity Level 
High Medium Medium 
ISO 9001 Certified No Yes Yes 
ISO 14001 Certified No Yes Yes 
OSHAS 18001 
Certified 
No No No 
Overall Integration 
Quality and Lean 
Low High Low 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
This article sheds new light on industrial practice related to 
the integration of quality and lean in production systems. By 
drawing on operational experiences from three Norwegian 
manufacturing companies in global competition, new insights 
are revealed on how companies manage their company 
specific production systems strongly influenced by TPS, and 
customer requirements for ISO certification. 
Although three case studies do not allow for broad 
generalizations, the results indicate that a good integration of 
lean and quality requires two necessary conditions. First, a 
high level of process maturity is important. QatS is dependent 
on stable and standardized work processes, designed and 
refined to prevent errors and deviances. This point resonates 
with both the “TPS-way” and the “ISO-way”. Second, the 
production systems themselves also need time to mature. 
What may start out as disperse initiatives for batch reduction, 
housekeeping, quality, TPM etc. may gradually be brought 
together under a common concept, as happened in Company 
B. The other companies have not yet reached this level of 
production system maturity. Of course this integration does 
not arise spontaneously, but needs to be managed and 
supported by experts on organizational design. Tacit 
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knowledge needs to be codified into ways of working that is 
mutually agreed on.  
Findings from these explorative industrial case studies 
might be the starting point for further research. Questions to 
be picked up are the following: What is the key to 
successfully integrating quality and lean in production 
systems? How can companies who score low on quality and 
lean maturity levels close this gap to become integrated, 
without developing separate systems for the "TPS-way" and 
the "ISO-way"? Finally, how can companies who already 
have two separated organizations and systems for quality and 
lean merge these into one holistic and efficient production 
system?  The answers to these questions should be interesting 
both to industrial practitioner and to researchers seeking new 
insights on production systems. 
This paper has applied a qualitative and explorative 
methodology, well suited to research a novel topic. As the 
field of holistic production systems matures, research will 
benefit from more rigorous research models and the 
application of quantitative methodology. We propose the 
research framework of figure 1 as a starting point for 
developing reliable measurements that can be used to predict 
empirical patterns of association and causal effects. 
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